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Entrapment or Freedom
Enforcing Customary Property Rights Regimes
in Common-Law Africa
Sandra F. foireman
13.i. INTRODUCTION
Customary land tenure arrangements in Africa have enlivened and sustained the
role of customary leaders and authority patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa long after
they would have otherwise faded into disuse. Because the allocation and control
of land has meaning that extends beyond the cultural realm and into the economic and political, those who control it are assured an important role in the
social and political hierarchy of a community. The role of customary authority in
Sub-Saharan Africa is tied to the colonial experience and to the decisions of colonial officials to create separate categories of land rights and authority structures
for citizens and subjects. Where colonization did not occur, as in Ethiopia, we do
not see the same significant role played by customary leaders in land administration systems or even in conflict resolution. Thus, property rights and authority are
intimately connected throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.
This chapter examines customary property rights and the role of customary
leaders in enforcing those property rights from an institutionalist perspective.
The issue of societal benefit is at the forefront ~f this chapter, which proceeds in
three parts. Subchapter 13.2 discusses the pervasiveness of customary tenure and
customary authority structures throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and their genesis
in the colonial era. Subchapter 13.3 notes the lack of consistency between statutory law and customary law, which leads to a pluralistic legal setting. This part
also identifies the winners and losers within customary legal systems. Subchapter
13.4 discusses how we can evaluate customary land tenure patterns and customary authority. The chapter ends by suggesting ways in which customary property rights and customary authority might persevere with a positive benefit to
the society.
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ip. CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE IN AFRICA

Prior to colonization, Africa was not a vast undifferentiated and ungoverned area.
There were city-states and kingdoms, varying greatly in size and control of territory.
These were sc<1ttered across the continent in the most habitable areas. Between
the city-st<1tes were often large tracts of un-administered land, forests, and deserts.
Jn the most politically organized societies, such as that of Abyssinia' or the Ashanti
kingdom,2 there was more resistance to colonization, which delayed or impeded
foreign domination. In organized, pre-colonial political systems, law - what we now
refer to as customary law - existed. However, there were also many areas of the continent untouched by customary law because the forms of political authority that
existed were not as complex as the political kingdoms or were simply non-existent.
During the colonial era, "customary law" regulated access to land for Africans
and continues to govern land tenure over approximately 75 percent of Sub-Saharan
Africa.1 However, "customary law" during the colonial period was substantially different from that in the pre-colonial period. as it was no longer an instrument of
organization, but a tool of domination - a fact that has led some scholars to assert
that it was reconstructed as something new during the colonial era.i Virtually every
colonized country in Africa had two systems of landholding in the colonial era, one
that was regulated by the state and one by: customary law and traditional leaders.
The land regulated by the state was privately held by settlers and only infrequently
by Africans. The rest of the land was governed by customary law. Although privately
held land might have changed hands at independence, reflecting changes in population and political fortunes, customary land was largely left untouched, still regulated by and for the collective ethnic group. At independence, few countries had
the capacity to embark on the herculean effort of unifying the disparate landholding
institutions. Instead, an institutional lock-in occurred and the existing, bifurcated
landholding system has remained intact to the present day with private and customary lands existing and administered separately in every country in Sub-Saharan
Africa except Ethiopia.>
'

Abyssinia was the political kingdom that was a precursor to modern-day Ethiopia.
Located in what is currently Ghana, the Ashanti kingdom resisted British control and was not incorporated into the empire completely until 1902.
1
See Interview with Clarissa Augustinus, Chief, Land and Tenure Section, Shelter Branch, UN
Habitat, regarding her presentation Key Issues for Africa and Globally (2003), in Tororo, Uganda
(Sept. 14, 2005).
• See Terence Ranger, '/he Invention ofTradition in Colonial Africa, in T11E INVENTION OF TRADITION
('f. Ranger & E. llobsbawm eds., Cambridge University Press 1983); Martin Chanock, Paradigms,
Policies and Property: 1\ Heview of the Customary Law of Land Tenure, in LAW IN COLONIAL AFRICA
(K Mann & R. Roberts eds., Heinemann Educational Books 1991).
5
See Sandra F. Joireman, '/'he Mystery of Capital f!omzation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Women, Property
Rights imd Customary I .aw, 36(7) WORLD DEV. 1233 (2008).
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Private and customary land tenure institutions each articulate a very different bundle of rights to land, necessitating two different control and enforcement
regimes. In the colonial era, this dual system followed racial lines; natives used
land, white colonizers owned it. Because colonial governments did not find conceptions of land holding that were equivalent to that of fee simple or exclusive land
ownership among colonized peoples, it was assumed that landholding was vested
in the community. Africans maintained rights to land as groups and those groups
were overseen by a chief who controlled land allocation. White colonizers had
their property recorded in legal documents and their disputes heard in state courts,
while Africans pursued conflict resolution through customary authority figures and
rarely had written documentation of their land claims.
The belief in African communal land rights was supported by two linked administrative impulses of the colonial government: 1) the colonial administration's need
to expropriate land and govern its occupation and exchange with some degree of
legality; and 2) the necessity of space for the indigenous population to live and to
farm. 6 The British and the French followed different systems of organization in their
colonies with the French choosing to rnle directly through colonial officials, and
the British following a system of "indirect rule" in which British colonial officials
exercised power through local leaders.7 Under the system of indirect rule, the best
type of arrangement to meet the indigenous population's need for space required no
administrative oversight by colonial officials; hence the creation of native reserves,
customary tenure areas, or tribal homelands. These areas could be administered by
"traditional" leaders without requiring expatriate civil servants working in the adjudicative and administrative institutions of the colonial state. Where traditional rulers
could not be found, they were created and empowered. Where their previous powers did not relate to the administration ofland, they were given new powers.
The colonial state was complicit in supporting property rights claims proffered
by traditional leaders when they served the goals of administration and control. In
Ghana, for example, different versions of "customary law" were presented to colonial officials for their support by self-interested leaders, each of whom described a
different version of the customary practices in their community. 8 Colonial officials
were then left to decide which version they would recognize. At independence, the

6

See

Chanock,

supra

note 4; MARTIN CHANOCK,

LAw,

CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE

COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (Heinemann Educational Books 2d ed.

1998);

MAHMOOD MAM DANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPOR.ARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE
7

COLONIALISM (Princeton University Press 1996).
See Sandra F. Joireman, Colonization and the Huie

Law and Civil Law Countries,

8

of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common

15 (4) CONST. PoL. ECON. 315 (2004).
KATHRYN FIRMIN-SELLERS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GOLD COAST
(Cambridge University Press

1996).
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enforcement of customary land rights typically remained with traditional leaders,
although their role is increasingly under threat.
Customary law is, and has been, malleable and dynamic. It has changed over time
and, in this regard, it is similar to common law that evolves in response to changing
circumstances and customs. Customary law was both named and developed in the
context of colonization and it became a mechanism for the assertion of power by
dominated groups during the colonial era. Customary law is explicitly political and
can also be an arena for the struggle for power within a society.9 During the colonial era, customary law provided a way for older men within traditional societies to
reclaim some of the independence and control that they lost due to colonization.
They were able to use customary law to assert control over women, younger men,
and children within their ethnic group - the limited realm over which they were
given authority by the colonial power. It has been observed that "those who were
doing economically well within the limits imposed by the colonial regime were
those who had the most interest in promoting a 'customary' view of persons. A view
that could be presented and validated in customary terms." To some extent, it is
still the case that customary law can be used as a tool for the promotion of the interests of certain individuals who are given responsibility for its definition." In a 2002
interview, a senior chief in Kenya recognized that customary law in the current era
is created and molded by contemporary tr~ditional authorities, saying, "Customary
law is what I describe.'' 12 The emphasis in this claim is on the control of the customary leader over what is defined as law. It is malleable and subject to the interpretation of leaders. Similarly, with respect to the nature of customary authority,"[ m ]any
of the supposed central tenets of African land tenure, such as the idea of communal
tenure, the hierarchy of recognized interests in land (ownership, usufructory rights
and so on), or the place of chiefs and elders, have been shown to have been largely
created and sustained by colonial policy and passed on to post-colonial states."•>
In communal tenure areas, where an emergent land market developed, colonial
officials suppressed it because a land market did not fit with ideas regarding the
communal nature of African land tenure.'f Colonial officials persisted in the belief
10

•1

See Pius S. Nyamhara, Immigrants, Traditional' Leaders and the Rlwdesiar1 State: 'T11e Power of
'Communal' I ,and '/imure and the l'olitics of Land Acquisition in Cokwe, Zimbabwe, 1963-1979, 27(4) J·

S. AFR. STUD. 771 (2001); SARA BERRY, No CONDITION Is PERMANENT (University of Wisconsin Press
1992).
'" Chanock, >upra note 4, at 72.
See FRANCOISE KI-ZERBO, LES FEMMES RURALES ET L'ACCESS A L'INFORMATION ET AUX INSTITUTIONS POR LA SECURISATION DES DROIT FONCIERS, ETUDE DE CAS AU BURKINA FASO (FAQ 2004).
" Human Rights Watch, Double Stamlards: Women's Property Rights Violations in Kenya, in KENYA 11
(Human Rights Watch 2003).
•1 Ann Whitehead & Dzodzi Tsikata, /'oliq Discourses 011 Women'.~/ ,and Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa:
'/"he Implication~ of the Re-tum to the Customary, 3 (1 & 2) J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 67, 75 (2003).
" Evidence of the rapid evolution of land markets in the work of Hill (1963) on cocoa fanning and Budy
(1979) on South Africa, also work in Zimbabwe by Cheater (1990). In Ethiopia, in traditional tenure
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that Africans defined themselves only in terms of their group and kinship ties, even
with regard to their economic behavior. This has led to criticism of the entrapment
of Africans in the "world of the customary":
European mle in Africa came to be defined by a single-minded and overriding
emphasis on the customary. For in the development of a colonial customary law,
India was really a halfway house. Whereas in India the core of the customary was
limited to matters of personal law, in Africa it was stretched to include land. Unlike
the variety of land settlements in India, whether in favor of landlords or of peasant
proprietors, the thrust of colonial policy in Africa was to define land as a communal
and customary possession. Just as matters of marriage and inheritance were said to
be customarily governed, so procuring basic sustenance required getting access to
communal land. With this development, there could be no exit for an African from
the world of the customary.''
I argue that whether Africans are entrapped within customary law or freed by the
ability to express their social and economic interests within it depends on which
group of Africans we are discussing, as the legal recognition of customary law and
tenure systems creates winners and losers with different interests. Because it applies
to people as members of ethnic groups and not as citizens, customary law constructs
a separate arena of authority beyond or outside of the state.

in.

CUSTOMARY VERSUS STATUTORY LAW: THE
WINNERS AND LOSERS

As in the colonial era, those who gain the most from customary systems of land
tenure and authority are those who control it. Because customary law is unwritten
and customary authority positions can be quite powerful and lucrative, they are
sometimes the subject of dispute. In 2008, struggles over succession to a Ghanaian
chieftainship resulted in twenty deaths as well as a greater number of wounded
people. 16 The violence surrounding these struggles is evidence of the desirability of
chieftainships. One of the reasons traditional leadership positions are sought after is
the potential to gain from control over land. With the development of land markets
within customary land systems, for example, those who gain the most from emergent markets in land are those with the most influence over its allocation. 17

'

'

5

6

'7

systems, there was evidence of land sales in communal tenure areas with the monetization of the
economy. Sandra F. Joireman, Contracting for Land: Lessons from Litigation in a Communal Tenure
Area of Ethiopia, 30 (3) CANADIAN J. AFR. STUD. 424 (1996).
Mamdani, supra note 6, at 50.
See International Committee of the Red Cross, Ghana: Red Cross helps victims of fighting in north (July
10, 2oo8), available at http://www.icrc.orgM'eb/Eng/siteengo.nsf/htrnlall/ghana-news-100708?0pen
Document&style=custo_print.
See Admas Chimhowu & Phil Woodhouse, Customary vs Private Property Rights? Dynamics and
Trajectories of Vernacular Land Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 (3) J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 346 (2006).
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It is ·evident that customary authority figures benefit from the recognition of customary law and land tenure. However, there are additional benefits that can accrue
to a community from customary systems of property rights. There is a rich literature
documenting the flexibility of customary land and resource arrangements. This sort
of flexibility can be particubrly helpful in controlling common property resources
such as forests, pasture land, and water.' 8 At the same time, the use of customary
institutions to control these resources further accentuates the divide between those
governed by customary and those governed by statutory law.'9
Customary law was formed for ethnic groups and is used to control and organize
ethnic groups. As such, it is very much rooted in place rather than ethos or ideology.
Integrating or blending customary law with statutory law, which is based on notions of
citizenship, poses tremendous problems. Customary law relates to groups of people
in a place and only loosely to those people who live outside of that place. Customary
law also differs between ethnic groups in the same country. Thus, conceptions of
citizenship that bring with them ideas of equality across national space and territory
are often at odds with customary law. Take, for example, the pernicious problem of
land rights for migrants. Although virtually every constitution in Sub-Saharan Africa
enshrines notions of citizenship that transcend ethnicity and region, migrants within
a country who seek to settle in rural areas still face tremendous difficulties in either
purchasing or renting land to farm, and on which to build housing.2°
As citizens of a country, migrai1ts should have the same rights to property all
over the country. Yet, they do not, as customary land tenure systems by their nature
exclude those who are not autochthones, or "sons of the soil.'"' This restriction on
property ownership prevents entrepreneurial activity by nationals who might like to
move into an area and acquire land. In fact, it may be easier for foreigners to access
land for economic development than nationals in their own country who are not of
the right ethnic group for a particular area; contrast this with the ease with which one
•·' See Tor A. Benjaminsen & Christian Lund, Fomzalisation and lnfomzalisation of Land and Water
Hights in Africa: J\n Introduction, 14 (2) EuR. J. DEV. RES. 1 (2002); CAMILA TOULMIN, PHILIPPE
LAVIGNE DELVILLE, & SAMBA TRAORE, THE DYNAMICS OF RESOURCE TENURE IN WEST AFRICA
(Heinemann Educational Books 2002); Philip Woodhouse, African Enclosures: J\ Default Mode of
Development, 31 (10) WORLD DEV. 1705 (2003).
"' See Je;;e C. Ribot, Decentralisation, Participation and J\ccountability in Sahelian Forestry: Legal
Instruments of l'olitical-i\dministrative Control, 69 (1) AFR. 23 (1999).
u. See V. Adefemi Isumonah, Migratio11, Land 'Jenure, Citizenship and Communal Conflict.~ in J\frica,
9 (1) NATIONALIS~I AND ETHNIC PoL. I (2003); Ki-Zerbo, supra note JI; INTEGRATED REGIONAL
INFORMATION NETWORK, COTE D'IVOIRE: SOLVING CONFLICT ON A SMALLER SCALE (2006).
Nyamhara, supra note 9; Pauline E. Peters & Daimon Kamhewa, Whose Security? Deepening Social
Con/lict over 'Customary' Land in the Slwdow of Land Tenure Refom1 in Malawi, 45 J. MODERN AFR.
STUD. 447 (2007); MARJA J. SPJERENBURG, STRANGERS, SPIRITS, AND LAND REFORMS: CONFLICTS
ABOUT LAND IN DANDE, NORTHERN ZIMBABWE (Bri\12004).
" See Isumonah, supra note 20; Peters & Kambewa, supra note 20; Spierenburg, supra note 20.
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can purchase a farm in any area of Australia, the United States, Canada, or Europe.
Any list of losers from customary land tenure arrangements has to include migrants,
whose right to own property and live anywhere within the territory is thwarted by
customary land ownership patterns and customary authority.
The second, and larger, group of losers from customary land tenure systems
and their corresponding authority structures are women. Women in Sub-Saharan
Africa face a distinctive social dilemma. Because of their labor, they are the mainstay of agricultural economies; yet, married women in most African countries do
not co-own marital property, do not have autonomous rights to lineage or family
land, and do not have the ability to protect and retain their homes and movable
possessions at the death of or divorce from a husband. There are some encouraging exceptions to these problems of property rights in West Africa where women
are able to maintain some rights through their natal lineages.22 There are also
some countries, such as Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia, and Ethiopia, where
efforts have been made to give women legal protection of property rights where
they have not traditionally existed.23 That said, in much of Southern and Eastern
Sub-Saharan Africa, women have not traditionally or legally shared the same protections of their property and inheritance rights as men, or women in other parts
of the world. They face difficulty in representing themselves economically and
legally, for example in selling their own produce or in buying new fields on which
to grow crops.24 In Rwanda, women were not recognized as full citizens until the
1991 constitution. 2 5 Previous to that point they were legal minors. If a Rwandan
woman wanted to buy a plot of land, a building, or even a home, she had to either
do so in the name of a male relative or establish a corporation that could act as
a legal person for her.26 The position and status of women in Africa is so critical
and so unusual that it needs to be taken into consideration, not just by feminist
scholars, but by anyone wanting to write seriously about agricultural development,
property rights, or capital formation.
" See N. Thomas Hakansson, The Detachability of Women: Gender and Kinship in Processes of
Socioeconomic Change among the Gusii of Kenya, 21 (3) AM: ETHNOLOGIST 516 (1994); interview with
Dzodzi Tsikata, in Accra, Ghana (July 6, 2007).
' 3 See Married Persons Equality Act 1 of 1996 (Namib.); ASKALE TEKLU, LAND REGISTRATION AND

"I

'1

'6

WOMEN'S LAND RIGHTS JN AMHARA REGION, ETHIOPIA (International Institute for Environment
and Development 2005); Women Lawyers Demand Early Passage of Property Rights of Spouses Bill,
GHANAIAN NEWS AGENCY, 2009; INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK, MOZAMBIQUE:
WOMEN STILL STRUGGLE FOR LAND RIGHTS DESPITE NEW LAW, (2003).
In Uganda, for example, while women grow food crops, many ethnic groups view it as the job of the
husband to sell the agricultural produce at the market. Focus group interview with Women's Guild of
Tororo, Tororo, Uganda (Sept. 14, 2005).
See L. Muthoni Wanyeki, Introduction, in WOMEN AND LAND JN AFRICA: CULTURE, RELIGION AND
REALIZING WOMEN'S LAND RIGHTS (L. M. Wanyeki ed., Zed Books Ltd. 2003).

See id.
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In most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the idea of co-ownership of marital property
is an alien one. \Vomen are not supposed to own property but rather, under customary law, they are (or were) property. The idea of a woman acquiring property in her
own name during marriage is incendiary, as it implies that she is not committed to
her husband or his family. 2 7 In the few African countries where there are laws providing for the co-ownership of marital property, such as the family home or other
assets, these laws have proven very difficult to enforce because they are incompatible
with cultural practices. 2s
Typically women have secondary rights to land access, meaning they can cultivate
land because they have married a man who is of a particular kinship group or they
have children who are seen as belonging to a particular kinship group. 2 9 In many
places, once they marry and go to live with their husband's family, women are not
viewed as having membership in their lineage, but are seen in some ethnic communities as a member of their husband's lineage and in others simply as a commodity.3°
One women's organization in Uganda developed the slogan "Women Have No
Home" to illustrate the difficulty women face as they are not seen as belonging to
any kinship group.>'
'' This point was driven home in conducting interviews on the new land law in Uganda in 2006. In an
interview with a woman who was the regional g~nder officer for her part of the counhy, a fairly elevated position and one in which she was required to assist women in defending their property rights,
the interviewee reported that "\Vomen can't own land and have stable marriages.'' See interview with
widow J., Mbarara, Uganda (2006). This is a sentiment that was repeated, albeit less vividly, in other
interviews and contexts. See also Human Rights Watch, supra note 12.
'' See Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgens, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture and Women's
Inheritam:e Hight., in Chana, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (2001); Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, Impact
of Privatization 011 Gender and Property High ts in Africa, 25 (8) WORLD DEV. 1317 (1997); INTEGRATED
REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK, INHERITANCE RIGHTS STILL A THORNY ISSUE, Feb. 14, 2006.
"' See Winnie Bikaako & John Ssenkumba, Gender, Land and Hights: Contemporary Contestation.' in
Law, l'olicy and l'rac:tice in Uganda, in WOMEN AND LAND IN AFRICA (L. M. Wanyeki ed., Zed
Books Ltd. 2003); Wanyeki, .,upra note 25; Ingrid Yngstrom, Women, Wives and Land Hights in Africa:

Situating Cemler Bqond the l lou.,ehold in the Debate over Land l'olily and Changing Tenure Systeni,,
30 (1) OXFORD DEV. STUD. 21 (2002); Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 13.
,,, This is true even in matrilineal societies where descent is traced through the female line. That said, it
would be wrong to suggest that in all circumstances under customary tenure women have no access
to land through their own kin group. In West Africa, women will have some residual claim to land
in their natal kinship group or through wider social ties. However, this is more the exception than
the rule. There is an anthropological framework for understanding the differences in lineage attachment for women in Africa. There is a bifurcation between lineage systems in which women maintain
an identity in their natal lineage after marriage and those lineage systems in which they do not. If a
woman maintains a social identity formed by her natal lineage after marriage, she is likely to have
property rights associated with that lineage. However, if she is "detachable" and is identified with her
husband's cla11 or lineage after marriage, then she is likely to have few, if any, socially recognized property claims in her natal lineage. Hakansson, supra note 22.
'' This was articulated as a sloga11 by the Mifumi Project, a Ugandan NCO active in women's issues.
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The fact that women have only secondary rights to land is inequitable, but the
degree to which it becomes problematic depends on demand for land in a given
area. Some anthropologists have praised the flexibility of traditional customary
arrangements because they can adapt to changing family composition more readily than more formalized systems.32 Where demand for land is low, this is almost
certainly true. However, when the value of land becomes higher it is easier for traditional leaders to find themselves unable to accommodate all requests for land
to farm. Where there is a high demand for land, migrants, divorced women, and
women in general are most likely to face exclusion.n
Women's property rights and access to land are linked to inheritance patterns.
Under customary law, daughters tend to inherit less than sons, and often nothing at
all.H Inheritance can also be problematic for surviving spouses. Aili Tripp notes that
in Uganda, "under customary law ... a woman may have jointly acquired land with
her husband and may have spent her entire adult life cultivating land, but she cannot claim ownership of the property. If he dies, the land generally goes to the sons,
but may also be left to the daughters. Nevertheless, (the husband] may still leave
the wife with no land and therefore no source of subsistence.''35 With the mortality
effects of AIDS, civil conflict in Africa, and decreasing life expectancies for men and
women, institutionalized inheritance structures are of particular interest in understanding patterns of capital formation.
In many polygamous households, if the head of household dies, any childless
wives will receive nothing and will have to return to their families.36 Because these
women have not provided the lineage with heirs, they have no status and no further link to any member of the lineage. Therefore, they can no longer expect to
receive access to lineage land on which to farm or live. Women with children are
in a slightly less precarious position. They are still not regarded as members of the
" See Angelique Haugerud, Land Tenure and Agrarian Change in Kenya, 59 (1) AFR. 6i (1989); Jean
Ensminger, Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Fomwl and lnfomzal Rights to Land in Africa, in
THE FRONTIERS OF NEw INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (J. N. Drobak & J. V. C. Nye eds., Academic
Press 1997 ).
ll See In Zimbabwe, land-allocating authorities viewed divorced women in particular as social misfits.
Nyambara, supra note 9, at 777.
34 This is true even in Islamic areas where sharia law controls inheritance for women. In Nigeria, in
the northern states where sharia law is recognized, women still do not inherit as dictated by sharia
law. The reason given is that according to the Maliki school of sharia law, Nigeria is an area in which
Islam was imposed by conquest and therefore some allowance for pre-existing customs, urf, must be
allowed. Hussaina J. Abdullah & Ibrahim Hamza, Women and Land in Northern Nigeria: The Need
for Independent Ownership Rights, in WOMEN AND LAND IN AFRICA (L. M. Wanyeki ed., Zed Books,
Ltd. 2003).
31 Aili Mari Tripp, Womens Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in Africa: 17ze Case of
Uganda, 7 (4) AFR. STUD. Q. 1, 6 (2004).
36
See Bikaako & Ssenkumba, supra note 29.
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lineage, however, if they are taking care of minors, their property rights will sometimes be respected.'?
Some studies have argued that inheritance rights for women are not a problem.
In Kenya, for example, one study found that most women are able to hold onto
their land after the death of a husband by turning to the community as a whole to
gain support in legitimizing the wife's claim to the land.>8 In this study, a woman
losing her home and land after a husband has died was the 304exception rather
than the rule. This would be consistent with other studies in Malawi, Swaziland,
and Uganda finding that women are able to negotiate customary law and maintain
usufruct rights to land through social networking.39 However, these studies contradict the weight of evidence emphasizing the vulnerability of women's property
rights after the death of a spouse. Other studies in Kenya document that spousal
loss of property is a frequent occurrence.-1° In Uganda in 1995, the Federation of
Women Lawyers (FIDA) reported that 40 percent of the cases they handled were
related to the harassment of widows and property grabbing by their husbands relatives.-!' Poverty and scarcity of resources can tax the goodwill of family members.
If a woman has property left by her husband that is viewed as valuable, she may
find herself cast off with no land to cultivate and her household goods appropriated by members of the lineage. In Uganda in the Luwero and Tororo areas, about
29 percent out of a total of 204 widows indicated that property was taken from them
following the death of their husbands:+2 In Zambia, "(i]n an area where livestock
represents one of the few reserves of asset wealth, it was found that in the preceding
five years, 41% of female-headed households with orphans had lost all their cattle
and 47% had lost all their pigs."-1>
Women's loss of property upon the death of their husband is a human rights issue,
but it is also an economic problem. As women tend to be the ones cultivating the

17 See Interview with B, Tororo, Uganda (Sept. 14, 2005); RICHARD S. STRICKLAND, To HAVE AND TO
HOLD: \\'OMEN'S PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF HJV/AJDS IN SuBSAHARAN AFRICA (International Center for Research on Women 2004); Tripp, supra note 35.
'' See M. Aliber, C. Walker, M. Mach era, P. Kamau, C. Omondi, & K. Kanyinga, Overview and Synthe:;is
of Hesearch J!indings, in THE IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS ON LAND RIGHTS: CASE STUDIES FROM KENYA
(Human Sciences Research Council 2004).
N
See Laurel L. Rose, Women'., Strategies for Cu:;tomary Land Acce:;s in Swaziland and Malawi:
A Comparative Study, 49 (2) AFR. TODAY 123 (2002); Lynn S. Khadiagala, Justice and Power in the
Adjudication of Women's Property Hights in Uganda, 49 (2) AFR. TODAY 101 (2002).
4" See Human Rights Watch, supra note 12; RITU VERMA, GENDER, LAND AND LIVELlllOODS IN EAST
AFRICA: THROUGH FARMER'S EYES (International Development Research Centre 2001).
4'
See Bikaako & Ssenkumba, supra note 29, at 250.
4'
See LAELIA ZoE G1LBORN, REBECCA NYONYINTONO, ROBERT KABUMBULI, & GABRIEL }AGWEWADDA, MAKING A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN AFFECTED BY AIDS: BASELINE FINDINGS FROM
OPERATIONS RESEARCH IN UGANDA I (Population Council 2001).
41 Strickland, supra note 37, at 24. The study gave no indication of how this property was lost. Id.
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land to provide food for their families, their loss of land, livestock, and moveable
property has economic consequences for their children and for society as a whole.

13+ EVALUATING SOCIAL WELFARE
In spite of these considerations of equity, strong arguments have been made for the
benefits of customary land tenure systems and customary adjudicatory mechanisms.
In areas where land is relatively abundant, customary law can effectively regulate
the distribution of land in a manner that has fewer transaction costs than using a
more bureaucratized registration system. In these settings, formal systems of property rights show few benefits over customary systems of land rights and, when new
systems of property rights are adopted from the top down, they are unlikely to be
implemented fully as the transaction costs of land registration are too high to make
it worthwhile for people to register their land. After the Ugandan Land Act of 1998
made it possible for people on customary land to title their land and exchange it
through governmentally recognized methods, individuals in land-abundant areas
still chose to go through locally recognized institutions of exchange rather than the
legal system to document land transfers.+! These individuals felt their land was sufficiently secure to preclude any need to go beyond the recognition of members of
their local government in a land exchange. Until the value of land or its attributes
increases sufficiently to offset the transaction costs, titling and more formalized land
transfers will not be embraced.45 Moreover, rather than promoting security of tenure, titling efforts may lead to higher levels of conflict over land and thereby reduce
productivity.46
Given the health and welfare demands on African states, there seems to be little reason to interfere with a customary law system that is working well in a landabundant setting. In these areas, state mechanisms to regulate the registration and
transfer of land are unlikely to be utilized or enforced because individuals feel their
security in ownership or occupancy is sufficiently robust. However, no country has
abundant land resources in all areas, especially not in capital cities, which invariably
have shantytowns and slums that house people without the money or connections
necessary for land access. Moreover, there is increasingly a mix between customary
tenure arrangements and modern state-administered tenure systems, particularly in
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See Elin Hemysson & Sandra F. Joireman, On the Edge of the Law: The Cost of Informal Property
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peri-urban areas. It is in these areas where tenure systems and authority structures
mix and demand for land tends to be high that the two systems clash most visibly.
Where land is scarce and population densities are higher, land allocation is contested, conflict over land is more frequent, and resort to the courts for dispute settlement and recognition of land transfer is more likely. Consistent with the economic
literature on institutional change, ample evidence exists demonstrating the breakdown of institutions and the innovation of new ones when land values increase
in Africa.-17 In areas where land has a higher value, customary land ownership
patterns can empower and enrich those who make decisions regarding its allocation. "Authority in land whether vested in the chiefs, or in the government officials and political leaders, can in tum, lead directly to private economic benefits for
these actors, derived from land accumulation, patronage and land transactions."-18
Traditional leaders can practice the politics of exclusion, denying resources to
groups with less political power, such as divorced women and migrants, who are
easily identified and denied access to land communally held.-19
When and where is it appropriate to try to explicitly undermine customary leadership and customary tenure, with the huge social costs that are entailed in any such
attempt? This is not a politically correct question to either ask or answer. Yet, given
the push for economic growth and better macroeconomic policies, it is worth considering by what criteria we might judge the effectiveness of any land tenure system
or customary authority structure. One approach would be to assess the customary
land tenure_ institutions from the 30 perspective and examine the extent to which
they are well-<lefined, divestible, and defendable. However, in this chapter I would
like to avoid the question of whether and how customary land should be bought or
sold. Literature from the new institutional economics, as well as my own interview
data from studying property rights across Sub-Saharan Africa, point to a set of criteria that can help us evaluate the net social welfare resulting from any institutional
See John Bruce, Lmd Reform Planning and Indigenous Communal Tenure (1976) (S.J.D. dissertation, School of Law, University of Wisconsin); Joireman, supra note 14; SANDRA F. JornEMAN,
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: THE STATE AND
LAND, 1941-1974 (Ohio University Press 2000).
;' Camila Toulmin & Julian Quan, /ntmductirm, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE IN
AFRICA (C. Toulmin & J. Quan eds., IIED 2000).
;o See The ~lid-Zambezi Rural Development Project in Zimbabwe illustrates this problem. Jn this case
it was the government of Zimbabwe that in the 1990s recognized an area of communally held land
in Dande. They sought to reallocate the land in a more ecologically sustainable way that would be
conducive to agricultural development and the resettlement of families living on fonner Europeanowned land. In the process of doing so, they effectively stripped land rights from migrants who had
been living in the area peacefully and cooperatively for years. Spierenburg, supra note 20. By not
recognizing that migrants were part of this community, and instead adhering to the old idea of communally held lands belonging collectively to one people group, the government repeated the error of
colonization. Id.
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structure. Below, I develop a rubric that recognizes the joint nature of tenure systems and authority structures. As far as I am aware, there is no area on the continent
where customary leaders are recognized but customary tenure is not, or vice versa.
In this case, it is wholly appropriate to consider the definition and the defense of
property systems as a unified social institution that includes the rules of customary
land tenure and the authority structures that enforce it.5° The criteria I use to assess
customary institutions are: predictability, accessibility, equity, effectiveness, and
restraint. A measurement rubric is included in the appendix to this chapter.
First, any social institution must be transparent and predictable in terms of access
and structure. This should be the case whether it is a social norm or a statute. If I
own a house and want to improve it, I would like to know that I will own the house
in three years; otherwise my benefit might not be worth the costs of making any
changes. A property rights enforcement regime such as a customary dispute resolution process should assist people in maximizing their well-being by enabling longterm investment.5'
Second, social institutions must be accessible to function well. Courts, mediators,
or mechanisms that are so far away as to be too costly to reach in terms of money,
time, or both are ineffective in resolving problems.52 With "simple, local mechanisms, to get conflicts aired immediately and resolutions that are generally known
in the community, the number of conflicts that reduce trust can be reduced."5>
Economic historians have also observed the importance of accessible conflict resolution mechanisms in the development of markets. Where conflict resolution
mechanisms exist, markets with impersonal exchange can develop and thrive.54
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Third, social institutions must meet minimum standards of equity.» Those that
work only for one ethnic group or exclude one segment of the society are undesirable. Institutions that solve problems based on the highest payment received from
participants are also unacceptable (based on standards of equity). The less biased an
institution, the better it will be able to serve everyone within a society regardless of
their social location.
Fourth, any kind of allocation or enforcement regime must be able to serve its
role authoritatively and completely. Resolutions that are temporary, transient, or
must eventually involve another institution are disadvantageous.56 Temporary solutions indicate the powerlessness or insignificance of the institution and may also
identify a cumbersome extra step in attempting to achieve a goal, whether it be land
access or the resolution of a land conflict.
Lastly, social institutions are desirable to the extent that they do not rely on unrestrained violenceY Private allocation or enforcement of property rights through
violence can both consume valuable resources and undermine the potential for
economic progress.>8 Additionally, confl.ict resolution that occurs through violence
can exacerbate, rather than resolve, disputes.
Using these five criteria - (1) predictability, (2) accessibility, (3) equity, (4) effectiveness, and (5) restraint - we can assess the net benefit of different property rights
regimes and customary authority structures. Traditional authority structures and
conflict resolution mechanisms are strongest in the areas of accessibility, effectiveness, and restraint and weakest in terms of equity and predictability. Traditional leaders and conflict resolution mechanisms are often far more accessible than national
courts (high, according to the rubric in the appendix). They are able to effectively
adjudicate most property conflicts and only rarely lead to decisions that needed to
be appealed to national court systems (medium high). Moreover, traditional leaders
and conflict resolution systems seldom use violence (medium high). However, they
are not equitable in their adjudication of disputes as they favor the interests of men
over women and autochthones over migrants even though both are citizens of the
hme.~ in Contracting for Property Rights, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (E. C. Furuhotn & R. Richter eds., Texas A&M University Press
1<)91); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (Princeton
University Press 2005).
,,, See TERRY ANDERSON & FRED McCHESNEY, PROPERTY RIGHTS; COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND
LAW (T. Anderson & F. Mc:Chesney eds., Princeton University Press 2003); North, supra note 55.
57 See Fred S. McChesney, Covemment J\s Definer of Property Rights: Tragedy Exiting the Commons?,
in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND LAw (T. Anderson & F. McChesney eds.,
Princeton University Press 2003); Barry Weingast, Constitutions as Govemance Structures: The Political
foundations of Secure Markets, 149 (1) J. INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 286 (1993).
;' See TERRY L. ANDERSON & LAURA E. HUGGINS, PROPERTY RIGHTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY (Hoover Institution Press 2003).

;; See Cary D. Libecap, Distrihutional
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same country (low). Additionally, traditional leaders and conflict resolution mechanisms tend to make decisions that are compromises rather than a clear victory of one
party over another in a dispute. While this type of decision making can preserve the
integrity of the community, it renders traditional conflict resolution systems unpredictable in terms of the kinds of decisions that are made and the factors that are
taken into consideration.
Although it will not be attempted here because of space considerations, the land
tenure and dispute resolution systems of the government in each country could also
be subjected to the same set of assessment measures and these institutions would
rank high in some areas and low in others. Differences in the traditional and state
institutions would indicate the reasons why people would choose one over the other
or "fonun shop."

13.5. WHITHER TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURES?
What can we learn from the use of this assessment measure and the issues that have
been raised earlier in the chapter to better understand the role of traditional leaders
and customary law in the contemporary African setting? The first major lesson is
that there are conflicting authority structures that are delivering different bundles
of social goods. Increasingly, government officials are going to be implicitly doing
what I am explicit about here - assessing the effectiveness of the different existing
institutional systems. In this context, I would argue that if traditional leaders want to
maintain any sort oflegally recognized authority, they must consider their roles carefully. They must articulate an institutional identity that is not based on representing
a single ethnic group or a geographically bounded set of interests, but instead a set
of societal concerns that may have importance beyond the locality. For example,
they need to articulate their roles not as leading or constructing the legal parameters
for their ethnic group, but as preserving and protecting the land (or forests or water
resources) as the patrimony of all citizens of the country.
In a similar way, traditional leaders must begin to articulate the interests of the
whole society - not just the men. If traditional leaders do not begin protecting and
advocating for the economic and social well-being of women and children in their
con1111unities, they will find themselves slowly sidelined by alternative sources of
societal power as women's groups begin to challenge their authority through legal
action and legislation.
This leads to the second major lesson, which is that constitutional standards of
equity matter. If customary leaders and customary law are to remain relevant, they
must align with constitutional standards of equity and citizenship. Increasingly
around Sub-Saharan Africa, we are seeing constitutional challenges to customary
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authority based on citizenship rights. The Bhe case in South Africa is one example.59
In Uganda, women have articulated their demand for land in terms of constitutional
guarantees of equality of citizenship and equality of economic rights. 00
Lastly, traditional leaders and customary dispute resolution systems have a clear
advantage in their ability to provide a cheaper and more accessible source of land
allocation and conflict resolution than the state institutions in most contexts. If they
can allocate land and resolve conflicts in a manner that aligns with constitutional
concerns for equity and citizenship rights, then they are likely to be accommodated
rather than undermined in any reform of property rights and conflict resolution
systems that occurs.

13.6. CONCLUSION
This chapter began by discussing the genesis of the customary land tenure systems
and their endurance into the present era. It then addressed how customary law
creates a bifurcation of winners and losei:s in the society. Those who benefit from
customary law are traditional leaders, men and communities who are able to use
customary law to protect important resources. Losers under customary systems are
migrants, local entrepreneurs, and women. Given this split in the society between
winners and losers under customary law, this chapter proposed a rubric to assist in
assessing the overall impact of customary law on social welfare. Following this, I
offered some suggestions for how customary law and customary authority structures
might endure in their usefulness to society by playing to their advantages of local
knowledge and accessibility and addressing the weakness of inequity.

59 SE.'e llhe v. '/he Magistrale, Khayiditslw 2004 (2) SA 544 (C) (S. Afr.). In South Africa, women are
guarauteed equal rights under the law by a constitution that also recognizes the rights of traditional
leaders to allocate land. Given that in customary tenure systems women do not have access to land in
their own right, it was inevitable that a case would be brought on behalf of a woman denied access to
land. In South Africa, the decision of the constitutional court in the llhe case famously argued that a
woman must be allocated land by a traditional leader. However, the reason given in the ruling was not
that she had equal standing as a citizen of South Africa and a member of that kin group, but rather
that she had children that were members of that kin group and their rights could not be denied. What
was important in the llhe case was that the children were girls. A decision that these girls deserve
access to land because they are members of the kin group was an affirmation of their membership
in the lineage - a membership that was not previously explicit in the case of girls or women. For a
comprehensive discussion of the llhe case, see Christa Rautenbach and Willemien du Plessis, Refomz
of the South 1\frican Customary Law of Successirm: Vinal Nails in the Customary Law Coffin?, in this
volume.
r,, See Interview with Carol Bunga ldembe, Kampala, Uganda (Sept. 12, 2005); interview with Atuki
Turner, Kampala, Uganda (Sept. 16, 2005).
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APPENDIX

Institutional Assessment Rubric
Low

Medium

High

Predictability

Unclear what the cost
will be to utilize the
institution. Unclear
whether the institution
will work or how it will
work.

Not entirely apparent
why or how decisions
are made. Costs,
documentation,
and other needs
unspecified.

Costs and time frame
are clear up front.
Needed documentation
obvious. Nature of
decision-making
process is clear.

Accessibility

Not affordable for the
average person either
due to fees or side
payments demanded.
Location requires a
large sacrifice in terms
of time or money
to reach.

Affordable for some
people in the society,
although beyond
the reach of others,
proximate to some,
limited need for side
payments.

Fees are affordable for
the average person,
proximate venue to
people who will be
accessing.

Equity

Only serves the needs
of some members of
society. Discriminates
on the basis of sex,
ethnicity, or other trait.

Discriminates against
some members of
the society, serves the
needs of others.

Serves the needs
of all members of
the community.
No discernable
discrimination based
on individual traits.

Effectiveness

Unlikely to resolve
problem. Will need
to pursue some other
parallel or competing
process to achieve goal.

Can resolve
conflicts in certain
circumstances,
although in others it
is necessary to pursue
other institutional
remedies.

Will resolve problem
and/or provide service
finally and completely.

Restraint

Processes rely on
violence or the threat of
violence, intimidation,
or other harm.

While generally free
from violence or
intimidation, at times
these can enter into
the process.

Completely free from
unrestrained or illegal
use of violence and
threats.

